Reflections on the 25th Asia Pacific Roundtable, 2011

Written by Shona Leppanen-Gibson

I recently attended the Asia Pacific Roundtable, held in Kuala Lumpur in late May. The Asia Pacific Roundtable is in its 25 th year, and is a regional strategic summit that brings together leaders, academics, experts and others from around Asia. Governments, NGOs, military forces, universities, media and think tanks, are represented and invited to speak at the Roundtable. It is organised by the Malaysian Institute for International and Strategic Studies, in conjunction with its counterparts from other ASEAN nations. The participants are chiefly from ASEAN nations, as well as other Asian nations, and key Pacific nations, such as Australia, New Zealand, the USA, and Canada. Here, Pacific is understood slightly differently from how we may understand it in an Australian context – there really was no representation from the Pacific nations such Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and so on. I suppose this can be understood in the sense that these nations do not play a strategic role in the greater Asian region; rather their strategic role is more restricted to the Pacific region itself.

The emphasis of the Roundtable is really on ASEAN and its strategic relations and security relations with some of those key Asian and Pacific players. ASEAN is the cornerstone of the Asia Pacific Roundtable, and all elements of the programme are built around it. This year, there was a small Timor Leste presence, signalling the current intention of ASEAN to open its doors to one last member, at least for the time being. The Asia Pacific Roundtable is what is known in diplomatic circles as ‘a track two’ event. It is not about formal agreements or resolutions, but rather about confidence building, sharing of perspectives, and building relationships.

I have had an interest in regional strategic issues and the political economy of the Asian region for many years now. It is a very dynamic region, and the rate of change, sometimes sudden change, can at times give the appearance of chaos or instability. ASEAN includes democracies, authoritarian regimes, and military governments, emerging, developing and advanced economies. And of course there is China, India, Japan and the USA, all economic and strategic powerhouses, encircling this region.

It is inevitable that ASEAN is compared to the European Union, despite any protests by ASEAN member states or the EU itself. However, the fact is that the EU is the only working regional organisation of any significant scope and history, and therefore, the only real model available. To some extent it is an unfair comparison. Whereas the EU has set a common standard for its member states based on firstly the region, but also democracy, human rights, and financial regulatory framework ASEAN is very much based on the region – all other factors are very much the member nations’ ‘own business.’ In some ways, the EU is an exclusive regional club strictly based on values, while ASEAN is a regional club which espouses some values, but does not impose them on its members. This is not to say that one model is better than the other. They are simply two different approaches which have emerged from two different sets of circumstances, underpinned by differing values.

As with many regional summits, conferences and forums, China quickly became the dominant issue. In fact, in some ways China overshadowed the Roundtable, and seemed to usurp ASEAN as the focus. Very few topics or sessions were able to stay clear of China – even a session on water security seemed to be structured and dominated by the decisions and agenda of the Chinese nation. India and the USA were also given much prominence, but far less so. China and its strategic role in the region, particularly its security agenda, was the subject of the day, without question. In particular, recent happenings and the ongoing tensions between various ASEAN nations and China over the South China Seas and a number of disputed territories, often took centre stage over other issues.

One of the most interesting and surprising observations that was made at the Roundtable, not just by one participant, but by a number, was the observation that China has no cohesive foreign policy agenda. Dr Susan Shirk, US China specialist, as well as a number of other panellists made this or similar assessments of Chinese foreign policy. Many of these commentators observed that China and the Chinese Government is far more concerned about its own internal politics, rather than foreign policy. Internal politics, instability and internal discontent are far more threatening to China and the central government than any foreign policy matter. Therefore, although there is sometimes a belief or a perception that China’s interaction with the outside world is centrally driven, this is really not the case. For myself, and I believe a number of other participants, this was a revelation.

There were some excellent sessions, some very good sessions, and some less engaging sessions. Sometimes it came down to the presenters, and other times it was the content – some of the security treaty issues and trade issues can be very dry. And sometimes, when a number of the participants represent Governments, there can be some inhibition for them in discussing subjects and issues in a full and frank manner. They are much more likely to steer a diplomatic course that fits the agenda of the Government concerned. This is not to say that their contributions were not significant, but rather to acknowledge the reality of the political world they live in – and frankly, if you are a public servant, the reality is that it is your job to fulfil the will of your Government. Although political and Governmental representatives did make some interesting observations, the most engaging and interesting sessions were usually led by academics or journalists, who, uninhibited by such agendas, were often able to make far more probing and interesting commentary.

Traditional security issues dominated the agenda. There was much fan-fare for the participation of Admiral Willet, Commander of the US Pacific Command, and his presence saw the attendance of a plethora of top Malaysian military brass and their staff. It was of course a coup for the organisers to have this high ranking official in attendance, but in truth, the session was very uncontroversial and tactful. Even when discussing the South China Sea, the Admiral was entirely careful and diplomatic. Only when he was allowed to stray slightly away from the ASEAN region (into the Indian Ocean, while discussing the piracy issue in the Gulf of Aden), did anything new come to light.

For me as a trainer and consultant working in the areas of strategic thinking and leadership, I am always impressed to hear from a speaker who changes perceptions, or challenges the way people look at a situation. The standout session was on North Korea. The panel included a South Korean, a Chinese Professor, a North Korean, and Professor Andrei Lankov, a Russian defector by way of the Australian National University, and expert in Korea – as he explained it, he teaches Korean Society and History, to Koreans, in Korean, in South Korea. So, yes, an expert. Given this panel’s make up, fireworks were duly expected. And though it was a fairly diplomatic session, given the forum, onlookers were not disappointed. Every panellists, including the Chinese panellists, lambasted the North Korean leadership (bar, of course, the North Korean), and the North Korean’s message was that the situation was everyone else’s fault – the USA and their aggressive stance, South Korea’s domestic politics, and China’s .

Professor Lankov’s assessment of the North Korean situation would have been classic comedy, if it was not so serious. He delivered, deadpan throughout, the appraisal that every seemingly crazy move that North Korea makes is 100 per cent rational. He summed up their approach as “We’re crazy, we’re irrational, we’ve got nuclear weapons, give us money.” Every step that the North Korean make is carefully calculated to deliver this message, to tell the world that they are in fact, nuts. But Lankov also argued, that there was no other response available to the North Koreans. They are locked into this response, and they will continue to respond this way for decades to come. There is no way out for the leadership of North Korea. North Korea cannot afford to open up to the world or to capitalism the way that China did because of the existence of South Korea. If the North Koreans realise that for decades, while they have been starving, repressed, their children have been dying, their brethren in South Korea has been better off, healthier, freer, and more prosperous than them, and their leadership has imposed this upon them, it will mean suicide for the North Korean leadership metaphorically, and perhaps physically.

Traditional security was certainly the topic which attracted the most attention. Even matters of trade seemed to cede into the background and were barely on the agenda. This seemed unusual for me, as I associate ASEAN with trade and economic development – it almost seems to be the raison d’être for the region. Another oversight I felt was the lack of discussion about non-traditional security issues and disaster management. For a region which has seen countless disasters on massive scale over the last decade, even since the beginning of the year, it seemed to me strange that so much was concentrated on traditional security issues. While the ongoing threat of terrorism cannot be downplayed, nor can China’s security interests, compared to the number of deaths caused by natural disasters, it could be argued that non-traditional security issues really should be the focus of such a regional dialogue. The Boxing Day Tsunami alone, let alone everything that has happened this year, should have highlighted regionally that non-traditional security and disaster management are key strategic issues for all of ASEAN. Regionally, there is a small border stoush currently happening along the Thai-Cambodian border, and some unrest within a number of countries, but the potential hazards and potential causalities are far less significant than what has occurred due to natural disasters.

It occurred to me that perhaps there is a reason for this. Traditional security seems, in a way, manageable. Even if you are dealing with ‘crazy and irrational’ North Korea, or a militarised and assertive China, with no fixed or central agenda, you can negotiate – there is human will and give and take involved. No matter how difficult, there is always the possibility of reasoning with such forces, no matter how unlikely. In the case of non-traditional security issues and disaster management, you cannot negotiate with natural forces. You often cannot even predict them or pre-empt them.

So there is some comfort in dealing with traditional security even if it is obvious to all that natural disasters will cause far more harm, far more causalities and far more turmoil than any security issue (bar the potential of a nuclear North Korea, but that is still highly improbable, compared to a natural disaster).

But it still leaves me feeling that this is a big regional issue that really needs urgent and concerted attention. After the Boxing Day Tsunami, and the understanding of the scale of devastation that is possible in the region, one would have thought that disaster management, prevention, and recovery would be important strategic issues for all involved. It is disappointing to find that many would prefer to occupy themselves with what are essentially far off ‘potentials’ for conflict. And unlike a conflict in the South China Sea or a missile from North Korea, we know that large-scale natural disasters will continue tooccur in the region. It has happened over and over again, and the Asia Pacific region has felt the brunt of natural disasters like no other region has in recent years.

Having said all that, I imagine that there is still a bit of a lag in terms of these issues. Most of the world still doesn’t know what it is doing with climate change or even whether it is a real issue or not. It could also be that the regional expertise in disaster management is still rather technical, rather than strategic. Having trained many emergency services personnel over the years, many are very practical; although they can often see the big picture, they are too concerned about the nitty gritty of getting an important job done to translate what they do into an academic or strategic world. There were rumblings and occasional questions to the panellists about climate change and environmental issues from a number or participants. I imagine a reorientation of the agenda to these non-traditional security issues will happen over the next few years.

It was a quite an extraordinary experience to be able to participate in the Asia Pacific Roundtable. Knowing that for 25 years leaders and experts from around the region have met in this forum to discuss these important issues was humbling. There may be some new territory to chart and alternative directions to be incorporated, but overall, it was an enlightening and thoroughly invigorating experience.